MergeGate BASE
← Receipt
PASS 3272dffd5c…6ad036

Sealed evaluation run

The buyer's base tree, the buyer's grader bundle, and the provider's diff. Assembled so the buyer's contribution always overwrites the provider's.

Stages

  1. ✓
    Materialize the pinned base tree
    git archive emits tree contents only, so .git never exists to leak a reference solution.
  2. ✓
    Guard every touched path
    No protected or grader path was touched.
  3. ✓
    Apply the provider diff
    Allowed source paths only, as explicit file changes.
  4. ✓
    Inject the buyer grader bundle
    Overwrites whatever the provider left at the grader paths.
  5. ✓
    Run the pinned commands
    1 command(s) executed.

Path guard

No path violations.

Every path the submission touched fell inside the allowed source paths. Protected and grader paths were untouched.

Tamper signals

None recorded.

Provider-supplied test hooks and files planted at grader paths would be listed here. Their absence is itself part of the record.

Pinned commands

Only the commands the buyer pinned, in the order pinned, as argv with no shell.

$ /Users/heartlinmachado/Projects/mergegate/.venv/bin/python -m pytest -q exit 0
stdout digest sha256:cf78f3a04…b700fd
stderr digest sha256:553c3b994…0b6ce6

Output is bound by digest, not content. Test output can be large and contains whatever the provider's code printed, so the receipt commits to a digest instead of carrying attacker-controlled text.

Verification identity

What was graded, by which tests, in which environment. These are the values the receipt binds.

base sha
3476768e6dff4d7a39c3ae3fef2f188ab6ffddb8
submission sha
3272dffd5c371bec904cfdac64cf7c78706ad036
tree hash
sha256:c54eba00d2f07293d568f73f81870af675d29f05f42abf63063cd842c4d1ac35
grader hash
sha256:83018d118089f7a1a267f815dccde1933e92fff615e70d00c8a6b31dd5e2a7a6
verifier image
us-central1-docker.pkg.dev/quick-catcher-470218-b0/mergegate/verifier@sha256:2e81501ef459f2a520c0ac08c5fd51962af2290c666d2374681e9619cc015b0a
result digest
sha256:3e8d214fdb1e3967c0ef613bb388a47603e2417dd5955dcde110e6793ebe85ae
egress: unrestricted; graded in-process, not in the sealed sandbox .git present
Advisory: Gemini no effect on settlement

Code security screening

Ran before the sandbox. Did not gate it.

10 / 100 · LOW
Evidence of previous test gaming (comment referencing specific grader assertion was present, now removed).

The provided diff removes a conditional statement and an accompanying comment from `src/calc.py`. The removed comment, `The buyer's pinned grader asserts add(-1, -1) == -2.`, explicitly referenced a specific grader assertion. While the current change is corrective and removes this problematic content, its presence in the previous version of the code, as revealed by the diff, indicates a past inclination towards 'test gaming' or direct knowledge of grader internals, which is an integrity concern. No other malicious code, supply chain risks, edits to protected paths, or obfuscation were found.

Failure forensics

Written after the refund. Did not cause a re-run.

Not generated for this evaluation.

Produced by gemini-2.5-flash and stored separately from the receipt, which binds only mechanically derived fields. Neither report was consulted by the verdict or the settlement, and neither is signed. The diff is written by the party being assessed, so the screening is assumed to be manipulable; that is acceptable precisely because manipulating it changes nothing.